Youth Day – 16 June

Today we remember what happened on the 16th of June 1976. We remember a protest against unfair education policies. We celebrate all the young people who have helped form this country.

In apartheid South Africa, blacks and whites were educated separately. Afrikaans, the language of the ruling National Party, was introduced as the language of instruction in black schools. The Soweto Students’ Representative Council organised a march in protest against this policy and poor schooling conditions.

In 1976, learners from around the country demonstrated against unfair education conditions in the schools. In Soweto, police opened fire on 20 000 students, killing 12-year-old Hector Pieterson and 61 others. Eight months of violent uprisings across the country ensued.

This protest against unfair education policies came to represent a protest against discrimination and inequalities. it lead to the new constitution prioritising children’s rights.

The day is used to mark the valuable contribution of all young people in the establishment of democracy and the role of education in the future of the country.

Youth Day – 16 June

June is PTSD Awareness Month

Post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) can occur after someone goes through a traumatic event like combat, assault, or disaster. Most people have some stress reactions after a trauma. If the reactions don’t go away over time or disrupt your life, you may have PTSD.
from the National Center for PTSD

“Don’t let PTSD control you. Take the Step: Challenge your beliefs. Getting help is taking control, not a sign of weakness. Learn how to support someone who makes that choice.

What is the National Center for PTSD?

We are the center of excellence for research and education on the prevention, understanding, and treatment of PTSD. Although we are a VA Center, our seven divisions across the country provide expertise on all types of trauma – from natural disasters, terrorism, violence and abuse to combat exposure.

Although we provide no direct clinical care, our purpose is to improve the well-being and understanding of individuals who have experienced traumatic events, with a focus on American Veterans. We conduct cutting edge research and apply resultant findings to:

“Advance the Science and Promote Understanding of Traumatic Stress.”"

June is PTSD Awareness Month

Operation Sceptic

In memory of our fallen this and every June 10th; may God bless each of them. we will never forget our lost children of freedom.

Operation Sceptic

Operational Years: 1980

Objective of the Operation

61 Mech had to destroy the SWAPO command, control and logistic structures at QFL and Ionde complexes on 10 and 11 June 1980 respectively and thereafter conduct area operations east of the general line AFL, Dova and Muleme as well as north of the general line Dunafuao, Mulavi and Ionde for approximately 10 days.

Composition of 61 Mechanised Battalion Group

Commander: Commandant Johann Dippenaar
2IC: Major JNR Botha
Adjudant: Captain Thys Rall
Combat Team 1: Alpha Company 1SAI – Major Paul Fouche
Combat Team 2: Bravo Company 1SAI – Captain Louis Harmse
Combat Team 3: Charlie Squadron 1SSB – Captain Jakes Jacobs
Combat Team 4: Charlie Company – 1 Parachute Battalion – Captain McGill Alexander
Combat Team 5: Delta Company – 1 Parachute Battalion – Captain Piet Nel
Combat Team 6: Major JAB Swart
Medium Artillery Battery: Major TJ Vermaak
Echelon Commander: WO1 M Barnard
Light Workshop Troop: Technical Services Corps – Major W Diffenthal

Personal Impressions of the Commander

Instruction to plan an attack on the SWAPO command post of Chifufua

During April 1980, under great secrecy, I received a broad instruction to commence with the planning for an attack on the SWAPO command post at Chifufua, also known as QFL. The information at my disposal was very vague, but we knew that this command post was 180km directly north of beacon 25 at the border between Angola and South Africa.

The target allocated to 61 Mech was named Smokeshell while the operation was named Sceptic.

After approval for this operation was received from Sector 10, the Intelligence Officer, Lieutenant Ockert Swanepoel and the Quartermaster, Lieutenant Neels Halgryn were briefed and tasked to, under extreme secrecy, prepare the detail information regarding the target and ensure that the equipment for this operation was adequate and ready.

The fighting soldiers had to be prepared for this battle with training to do specific drills and tactical moves.

Initial thoughts

The initial information that was available about the target was vague, and at first it was considered that the Air Force had to bombard the entire target which was spread over an area of 3 × 12 km with 61 Mech doing the mob up task.

Preparation for the battle

During May 1980 one of the mechanized infantry companies, an armoured car squadron and support weapons were trained while on 15 May an artillery troop arrived at the base. On 22 May the second mechanized military company, engineers, medical teams, anti-tank and other elements also arrived

The battle group engaged in Exercise Gallop, which was designed to train for the pre-emptive attacks, and in particular the Smokeshell objective. Since this was the first major physical combat actions for most of the soldiers the training concentrated on drills such as:

Movement in line and rapid deployment in combat formation.

Fire support (from the air) and fire and movement by all arms of the service (Artillery, Mortars, Armour, Infantry).

Fire fighting in close combat, including trench fighting.

Rapid change of direction by combat teams.

Command and control by all levels of command. Radio orders were repeated over and over and execution thereof tested.

The commanders had to present their plans and then reherse the drills by commands on models. The commanders became annoyed because of the many times this was repeated, but in the end it proved to be one of the success factors in combat.

The fiber, endurance and guts displayed by these soldiers can make a nation proud of its citizens and its Defence Force.

By the end of May more key personnel arrived at 61 Mech and command vehicles started to arrive. Major JNR Botha, a Mot infantry officer from 4 SAI without any previous mechanised infantry experience was appointed as the second in command of the battle group. Major Botha detailed his experiences and exposure to the Mech environment in full detail with the stories he sibmitted, and it makes very interesting and amusing reading.

On 6 June the Air Force command vehicle, other command vehicles and the TOTE for the vehicles arrived.

Structure of the target

There remained uncertainty about the nature of the target in the sense that one expectation was that it had dug-in slit trenches and another expectation was that the target consisted of open hides above the ground-level.

By the time that 61 Mech had to depart, the unit was prepared to deal with a few open trenches while most of the hides were expected to be above ground level.

Presence of the Inspector General

During the training phase for this operation the Inspector General, Major General CF Holtzhuasen, Colonel PP Roberts and the Warrant Officer of the Army, WO1 GA Erasmus joined the battle group and they took part in the operation as well.

Confirmation of battle preparedness

Once the movement plan and tactical plan were finalised, each sub unit commander had to present the details of his own plan on a sand model which was then rehearsed on a daily basis by all the commanders.

By 5 June I was satisfied that each commander and the junior leaders knew the exact detail of their roles in the operation, which was the result of regular rehearsals of the tactical details of the operation. This contributed to the confidence of the commander who in turn could act fearlessly, and all of this contributed to the success of the operation.

Composition of the attacking force

The Battle Group was grouped in six Combat Teams with commanders as follows:
Combat Team 1: Commander Major Paul Fouche, Alpha company with three Mech platoons and an Anti Tank Platoon.
Combat Team 2: Commander Captain Louis Harmse, Bravo Company with three Mechanised Infantry platoons, and an Anti Tank Platoon and a 81mm Mortar Platoon.
Combat Team 3: Commander Captain Jakes (DJF) Jacobs, three armoured car troops, four support troop sections and one engineer section.
Combat Team 4: Commander Captain Mack Alexander, A company from 1 Parachute company consisting of three stopper groups of 28 men each.
Combat Team 5: Commander Captain Piet Nel, A company from 1 Parachute company consisting of three stopper groups of 28 men each.
Combat Team: Commander Major JAB Swart, reserve element with one engineer troop and one assault pioneer troop.
Medium Artillery Battery: Commander Major Tobie Vermaak, 8x 140mm guns, 8×81mm Mortars and one Infantry Platoon for protection.
Battle Group A Echelon: Commander WO1 MC Barnard. There were support vehicles for all the Combat Teams as well as the Light Workshop with Commander Major W Diffenthal, a total of 43 vehicles.

Battle Group Head Quarters had the following key personnel.

Battle Group Commander: Commandant Dippies (JM) Dippenaar
Second in Command: Major JNR Botha
Adjudant: Captain Thys Rall
Intelligence Officer: Captain PJ Botes
Lieutenant: Ockert Swanepoel

Lieutenant General CL Viloen, Chief of the Army, traveled with the HQ for three days.

Broad plan for Operation Sceptic

Operation Sceptic was planned in terms of the following 6 phases:
Phase 1

Commandant Anton van Graan, commander of 54 Battalion, had to deploy from D-16 day to secure the area between beacons 24 and 26 across the Angolan border up to Mulemba, to enable safe movement for the combat forces through that area.
Phase 2

All forces taking part in Operation Sceptic had to train and exercise for the operation
Phase 3

54 Battalion carried on with area operations while Battle group 10 under command of Commandant Chris Serfontein deployed north of the Ondangwa and Oshigambo areas for deception purposes. 53 Battalion under command of Commandant Jorrie Jordaan deployed at Etale to conduct area operations, also for deception purposes. 61 Mech Battalion Group had to move from Omuthiya to the target.
Phase 4

At first light on D-day the paratroop soldiers had to be deployed as stopper groups to cut off the enemy escape route from Smokeshell. The bombardment of Smokeshell by the Air Force has to commence at 08h00 and 61 Mech had to move from Mulemba, Mulavi and Chitanbo to Smokeshell that the attack could start at 12h00. Battle Group 10 had to move from Chitanbo and Dovu to attach Mulola. 53 Battalion had to move behind Battle Group 10 to attack Chitumbo.
Phase 5

After capturing the different objectives, the forces had to conduct area operations for approximately 10 days.
Phase 6

All forces had to withdraw back to their bases in South West Africa.

Movement from Omuthiya to the Target

The attacking force had to move in line for more than 250 km from Omuthiya to the target, with half of this distance in enemy controlled area.

This posed a real challenge and the plan was for the Eland 90 armoured cars to lead the way so that they could clear the route of enemy resistance and make the travel for the other vehicles in the column easier because of the wheel space that was narrower than that of a Ratel.

The wide width of a Ratel’s wheels made it difficult for different vehicles to follow in its tracks.

The Eland 90 armoured cars also had slowest momentum and it was best to put these vehicles in front of the column of vehicles.

The 140 mm guns followed directly behind the Eland armoured cars to enable these guns to deploy quickly and be ready to give support fire as soon as possible. This marching order proved to be the correct decision.

Motivational card handed to the soldiers

The spiritual and phychological preparedness of the troops was a critical matter that was addressed during training and during the operation it was addressed in a very special manner.

When the battle group was halfway to the objective, a motivational card was handed to each soldier and commander/leader. This card was prepared beforehand and placed in each vehicle with the instruction to the vehicle commander to wait for the instruction by the Battlegroup Commander before it could be opened and distributed to all members of the battle group.

Plan of attack for the 13 complexes that made up the target

In terms of the information at our disposal, the target consisted of 13 active complexes that were spread over an area of 3 × 12 km, but we did not know the composition of the enemy at each complex.

These complexes had no physical features to assist with the navigation or to define the lines of attack of the combat teams. We therefore planned to attack from the east flank and capture each of the complexes one by one until the complexes were under our control, instead of approaching the complexes from the front.

Surprise regarding the enemy positions

We were also informed that the enemy was not dug in but above the ground and that they would scatter as soon as the attack on their positions started. This information was wrong, because combat team 2 under command of Captain Louis Harmse was caught by surprise when dug-in 23 mm anti-aircraft guns fired at the attacking Ratels from an unexpected direction from a short distance while being used in a ground role instead of an anti-aircraft role. It then also transpired that SWAPO had trenches and bunkers on the objective, which were well camouflaged and defected.

First casualties in battle for 61 Mech

This unexpected anti-aircraft fire sadly caused the first casualties for 61 Mech in battle, and the loss of these soldiers caused great sorrow and shock.

The casualties were as follows:

Ratel Call sign 20:

74391806 PE Lieutenant Hannes du Toit
Ratel Call sign 21:

76338946 BG Rifleman FJ Loubser

77217907 BG Rifleman PJ Joubert

70518303 BG Rifleman CJ Venter
Ratel Call sign 21A:

76464809 BG Rifleman GJ Kemp

76389238 BG Rifleman JH Fourie
Ratel Call sign 21C:

75222695 BG Cpl P Kruger

77210839 BG Rifleman SM Cronje

77412153 BG Rifleman PW Warrener

772605788 BG Rifleman FJ Lello

77471423 BG Rifleman MC Luyt

76395813 BG Rifleman RN de Vito

76325646 BG Rifleman AJ Madden

Nightfall on 10 June 1980

At last light on D-day combat team 1 under command of Major Paul Fouche captured an enemy base and came to a halt between the trenches. It took an extraordinary effort by the battle group command to guide his combat team to safety.

By nightfall on 10 June approximately 370 of the enemy were dead on the objective. No enemy personel were captured, but a great amount of weapons and equipment was seized.

Medical evacuation by chopper under enemy fire

At one stage a helicopter had to do the evacuation of a casualty and it had to land under heavy enemy anti-aircraft fire. The pilot landed and evacuated the casualty successfully and for his bravery he was rewarded with the Honoris Crux medal.

Operation Sceptic

Memorial Day 2014

Memorial Day 2014 Parade Announcement

It is with great pleasure that we can announce our first USA parade march. SAMVOUSA Veterans will be participating in the Memorial Day Parade in Washington DC in 2014. It is the largest parade in the nation with over 3000+ participants including foreign veterans and is one of only four parades permitted in Washington DC.

The parade is organized by the American Veterans Centre in VA.

Information on the parade can be found at: National Memorial Day Parade

The American Veterans Centre also hosts a Review Stand at the Memorial Day Parade which has US Generals with NATO and Allied nation Ambassadors available to speak to veterans.

As many of our veterans would have to travel to Washington DC to participate in the parade we are working to secure discounted airline and accommodation in Washington DC. Details will be provided as and when they become available.

Dress attire for the parade can be found on the SAMVOUSA website Dress Regulations

Please note that this is subject to change so please check back for updates.

We hope you will participate in our first parade march and look forward to seeing you there.

Best Veteran Regards

Steve

National Chairman | South African Military Veterans Organisation of the USA (SAMVOUSA)

Memorial Day 2014

Savate - Ops Tiro a Tiro

En só het hulle gesterf. 30 jaar gelede – 21 Mei 1980 by Savate.

Maar wat onthou die leiersgroep wat daar in aksie was?

SAVATE – OPS TIRO A TIRO

Savate! Wat n nare plek! Ek sal altyd hartseer wees as ek terugdink aan daai ene. Ons het baie mense verloor. Dit was eintlik n bloedbad. Minder van ons en meer van Fapla. Maar so what??, sê Leon Grobler skouerophalend.

Horst Heimstadt wat een van die pelotons aangevoer het, wil nie onthou nie.

Dit is seker my menslike faktor. Hy sny net uit. Jy wil nie daaraan dink nie. Jy los dit agter.Tiro a tiro? was die naam van die operasie. Die teiken was Savate n piepklein dorpie aan die wesoewer van die Cubangorivier, 60 kilometer diep in Angola, waar die Angolese weermag (Fapla) n goed-ingerigte basis gehad het. Dit was Unita se oorlog.

Maar 32 Bataljon sou onder die grootste geheimhouding hul vuilwerk doen. Sonder lugsteun. Sonder artillerie. Net 81- millimeter mortiere wat vir kilometers deur die bosse saam met al die ander wapens, ammunisie en toerusting gedra moes word.

Die ou storie. In jou moer in stap, uitgeput by die doelwit aankom, veg teen n uitgeruste, beter toegeruste vyand, en dan so gou as moontlik terug wees oor die kaplyngrens. Deon (Falcon) Ferreira het die bataljon aangevoer, met Eddie (Big Daddy) Viljoen in n verkenningsvliegtuigie om die operasie vanuit die lug te koördineer.

Die grondverkenning is aan Willem Ratte toevertrou.

Dave Hodgson onthou die ordergroep: Disturbingly many questions raised as to the enemy’s strength and weaponry were to remain unanswered. We were convinced by the intelligence section that it would be a walk in the park.

Evert Burger was gereed vir die ergste.

Ek het gedroom Charl Muller, Heinz Muller, Evert Engelbrecht en Andy Falcus word doodgeskiet. Falcus het nog die vorige aand oefeninge gedoen. Hy was in my peloton. Ek het gewonder of ek hom moes vertel Maar hoe kon ek? Die volgende oggend toe Falcon orders gee en ek sien die lugfoto van Savate, toe herken ek dit; presies net soos in my droom.?

Daar was van meet af aan probleme. Die Unita-gids het die kluts kwytgeraak. Eers het die grondverkenning skeefgeloop. Falcon kon nie met Willem Ratte kontak maak nie. Toe moes die aanvalsmag wat met voertuie nader aan die teiken gebring is soek na n twee- spoorpaadjie iewers in die bosse wes van Savate. In stikdonkerte deur ruie bosse is in twee enkelgeledere aangemars.

n Vyandelike voertuig wat onverwags met die paadjie langs kom… Skote wat klap. Die verrassing was daarmee heen.

Die son het al hoog gesit toe die skeipunt bereik is. Die 81-millimeter mortiere het aan die suidekant gaan stelling ingeneem. Die bataljon se ou hande het die stormkompanies aangevoer. Charl Muller met Alpha- en Jim Ross met Foxtrot-kompanie, het die Fapla-basis vanuit die weste aangeval. Sam Heap, met Charlie-kompanie, was aan die noordekant gereed om op die vliegveld en transportpark toe te tas. Twee pelotons sou genoeg wees.

Die derde peloton het by die bataljonhoofkwartier as beskermingselement agtergebly.

09:00.

C.B. Brown se mortierpype het gereed gestaan. Oorkant die rivier in n observasiepos was Willem Ratte, reg om die mortiere op teiken te bring. Groot groen bomme het in die pype begin klingel.

n Paar vyandelike voertuie het uit die suide aangejaag gekom. All stations forward!? het die bevel vir die stormkompanies oor die radio’s gekom.

Fapla het geantwoord met 82-millimeter mortiere en 122-millimeter vuurpyle vreesaanjaend. By die vliegveld het die vyand met 14,5-millimeter lugafweergeskut op Sam Heap en sy troepe aangelê.

Hulle het skaars 30 meter gevorder, toe sewe man dood of gewond in die sand lê. Heap moes terugval. Daar was onder andere ook vrouesoldate!

Horst Heimstadt op Alpha-kompanie se linkerflank het drie gesien. Reg voor hom het een van Dave Hodgson se masjiengewere n vrouesoldaat wat opgespring het, feitlik middeldeur geskiet. Toe weier die masjiengeweer.

En die vyand skiet in n teenaanval twee van Dave se troepe dood. Dave het die radio gegryp en Charl Muller geroep. Tim Patrick, wat die radio beman het, het nie geantwoord nie. Dan maar vorentoe.

Die dooies en gewondes moes agterbly. Die reserwemagte sou hulle afvoer. Toe bereik Alpha-kompanie die loopgrawe, bunkers met oorhoofse dekking. Die bunkers is egter nie behoorlik opgeruim nie en toe Alpha die eerste geboue bereik, het hulle vuur van agter getrek.

Onmoontlik!

Wat sou die reserwemagte besiel om op hulle te skiet?

Iemand het n Fapla-uniform sien beweeg. Dave Hodgson, wat nou die bevel van die kompanie by Charl Muller oorgeneem het, het besef die gewondes is in doodsgevaar. Hy het vrywilligers gevra. Heel voor was Attie Roestoff, n stoeier, wat die gewondes soos sakke mielies oor sy skouers gegooi en na veiligheid gebring het.

Op die regterflank het Foxtrot-kompanie verwoed geveg. Heinz Muller was een van die eerstes om te sneuwel. Eduard Engelbrecht, sy pelotonsersant, is gewond en saam met die radiobediener agtertoe gestuur.

Heel op die regterflank het Evert Burger dit gehoor. Hy het Andy Falcus, Rhodesiër wat as mediese ordonnans opgelei was, gestuur om Engelbrecht te gaan help. Hy het Falcus nooit weer gesien nie…

Intussen het die vyand noordwaarts begin padgee; party te voet, ander met voertuie. 32 Bataljon was in Savate! Falcon en sy inligtingsoffisier, André Erasmus, het in die dorpie aangekom.

Waar is Charl??

Niemand het geweet nie.Het hulle hom nie gevang nie het Falcon gewonder en vier Buffel troepedraers laat naderbring.

Leon Grobler en n paar troepe het op n verkoolde liggaam afgekom. Hulle kon Tim Patrick net aan sy radio se handstuk (n swarte in plaas van n groene) herken. n Wit fosforgranaat teen sy bors is raakgeskiet.

Skielik het skote weer geklap. André Erasmus het inmekaar gesak. Dit was nét te veel vir die troepe. Hulle het die buit neergegooi en uit Savate padgegee. Falcon, Sam Heap, Jim Ross en Lars Ueckerman, het die vlugtende vyand met die Buffels oor die vloedvlakte agternagesit.

Party het in die rivier gespring en is deur krokodille gevang; ander is met die Brownings agterop die Buffels afgemaai of het hulle in stoppergroepe vasgeloop.

Die troepe moes terugkom om die doelwit op te ruim. Rolf Heiser het op Charl Muller afgekom, op n kort afstand geskiet toe hy oor n loopgraaf gespring het. Rondom het vier troepe gelê.

Een het nog gelewe, maar die dokter kon hom nie red nie. Op Rundu het die dominee en die sektorbevelvoerder, Gert Nel, Hermien Ferreira gaan opklop.

Linda Erasmus was buite met haar drie kinders doenig, toe hulle die nuus van André aan haar oordra.

Daarna is hulle na Charl Muller se karavaan om Zelda te vertel. Falcon het later die aand op Rundu aangekom.

Hy was so wit soos n laken. Hy het my en klein Alwyn vasgegryp. Ek het my man nog nooit so gesien huil nie,onthou Hermien Ferreira.

Die volgende dag was die aanvalsmag al op pad met die voertuie en tonne uitrusting wat gebuit is toe hulle moes omdraai. Eduard Engelbrecht en n troep het makeer.

Ons het Engelbrecht onder n bos gekry, met die troep so half bo-oor hom, asof hy hom wou beskerm. Hulle is op n kort afstand geskiet, vertel Sam Heap.

By die huis het die mense in die koerante gelees van 81 Swapoterroriste en vyf lede van die Veiligheidsmagte wat in n klein veldslag in die operasionele gebied gesneuwel het, toe hulle in n groot vyandelike hinderlaag op die grens ingeloop het.?

Niks van Andy Falcus en die nege swart troepe wat ook gesneuwel het nie; 15 in totaal 32 Bataljon se grootste verlies op een dag in die hele oorlog. Generaal Constand Viljoen was woedend oor die tipe operasie en die aanwending van sy voorste guerrilla-bataljon.

Die lesse van Eheke, toe die Recces in Oktober 1977 as stormtroepe aangewend was en sewe man verloor het, is nie geleer nie. Trouens, Savate is in die psige van 32 Bataljon ingebrand soos Eheke by die Recces.

En toe, ná die dooies begrawe, die wonde gelek en die nabetragting deur die hoë offisiere verby was, wat toe?

Toe niks.

Dave Hodgson skryf in sy memoirs: The only debriefing that we had as far as Alpha Company was concerned, was nil. Medals that should have been given to Horst, Attie, Augusto, Kiote, Peet, Grobbies, Carlos Paulo and Rod, were never even considered. After all Savate never took place. Unita were the victors.?

28 jaar later het ek n onverwagte skrywe van n soldaat in die Britse weermag ontvang.

Ek is gebore op 16 Oktober 1980. My ma is aan kanker oorlede. Ek was 15. My ma het n geheim van my gehou tot net voor haar dood. Ek en my sussie het nie dieselfde vader nie. My ma het my van my pa vertel. Hulle was albei jonk en hy was op die grens. My ma was bang dat ek in my pa se voetspore sou volg en by die weermag aansluit. My ma het vertel dat my pa op 21 Mei 1980 gesterf het…?

Savate?

Dit was asof een van die dooies opgestaan het.

Maar wie?

Ek ken nie sy ouers nie en wil nie die lewe vir hulle moeilik maak nie. Al wat ek vra, is om iets van my pa te hê om die leë spasie in my hart te vul. Ek word binnekort ook pa en wil baie graag n foto van ouma en oupa hê. Asseblief, help my om deel te kan hê van my pa se lewe.?

Só het korporaal Louis Engelbrecht gepleit. Die res van die storie is baie hartseer. Louis Engelbrecht is deur hel. Maar hy het dieselfde sterk gene as sy pa, Eduard Coetzee Engelbrecht.

Dit, en n onwrikbare geloof, het Louis deurgedra. Ek het een van sy oorlede pa se agt susters, Alinda, op Otjiwarongo opgespoor.

Hoe dra n mens sulke nuus oor?

Dit het skok, ongeloof, verbystering, ontkenning, selfs woede ontlok. Het ek die regte ding gedoen?

Wat as dit nie waar is nie?

n Paar maande later het Alinda bevestig: My jonger sussie Debbie het al die jare geweet. Daar is ?n kartondoos met briewe. Dit is verskriklik.

Nóg n stukkie waarheid oor Savate, 32 Bataljon, die Grensoorlog, het uitgekom.

Die Republikein

Savate - Ops Tiro a Tiro